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Abstract

We formulate a family of direct utility functions for the consumption of a differentiated good. This is used to generate a family of demand systems with flexible substitution patterns. Demand models for market shares can be estimated by regression enabling the use of instrumental variables. Models for microdata can be estimated with maximum likelihood. Our direct utility functions are based on a generalization of the Shannon entropy. They include dual representations of all additive random utility discrete choice models and more.

Keywords: market shares; product differentiation; duality; discrete choice; entropy

JEL: D01, C25, L1

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1 Introduction

We construct a family of direct utility functions that describe consumer demand for one unit of a differentiated good. A representative consumer with income y and consumption $q = (q_1, \dots, q_J)$ of the differentiated good has utility $u(q, y) = y + q \cdot v + \Omega(q)$, where $v = a - p$ is quality minus price. The function Ω is a generalization of the [Shannon \(1948\)](#) entropy which expresses taste for variety; we call it a *flexible entropy*. The family of flexible entropies is defined through a number of conditions. We provide rules for constructing flexible entropies and a range of specific examples.

Flexible entropy may be used to generate a large variety of substitution patterns. Consider for example the demand for automobiles: Automobiles with the same body type may be closer substitutes than automobiles with different body types. At the same time, automobiles of the same brand may be closer substitutes than automobiles of different brands. The different categorizations of automobiles are not nested and hence such substitution patterns can not be described by a nested logit model. We provide general structures with overlapping nests that can be used to describe such situations.

Models specified in terms of flexible entropy may be estimated using simple regression with instruments that are available within the model. In this respect, our paper is closely related to [Berry \(1994\)](#) and [Berry and Haile \(2014\)](#) who invert the market shares of an ARUM to find corresponding utility levels. Given that this transformation is known, [Berry \(1994\)](#) shows how model parameters may be estimated using standard instrumental variable regression techniques with inverted market shares as dependent variables. Inversion of market shares may be carried out with an explicit formula for the case of the multinomial and the nested logit models. However, these models lead to substitution patterns that may be implausible in many applications ([Berry et al., 1995](#)). More flexible substitutions patterns may be allowed using random parameter models, but then numerical methods are necessary to carry out the Berry inversion, which leads to numerical and computational issues in combination with the random parameters ([Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2014](#)).

In this paper we formulate models, not in the space of indirect utilities of discrete choice models, but in the dual space of consumption shares. This makes the inverted market shares directly available and numerical methods are unnecessary for calculating them. Consistency with maximization of a well-behaved utility function is automatically ensured. We provide a range of examples leading to substitution patterns that go well beyond the nested logit example. These may potentially be used as alternatives to the random coefficient logit in what has become known as BLP models [Berry et al. \(1995\)](#).

Flexible entropy models can also be applied to microdata of discrete choices,

allowing individual level information to be taken into account. In this case, numerical methods are required to compute the likelihood - this is the price we pay to gain the advantage of formulating models in terms of market shares or probabilities rather than in the dual space of indirect utilities. The likelihood can be computed via a fixed point iteration that we show is guaranteed to converge in a range of circumstances. Then models can be estimated using maximum likelihood. Random parameters are not required to allow for more complex substitution patterns than plain or nested logit.

The family of models based on flexible entropy is large: we show that it comprises models corresponding to any additive random utility (ARUM) model. For the multinomial logit model ([Anderson et al., 1988](#)), the corresponding flexible entropy is the Shannon entropy. The flexible entropy family is in fact larger than the family of ARUM, we show that flexible entropies exist that lead to demands that are not consistent with any ARUM.

[McFadden \(1978\)](#) developed a family of discrete choice models based on the form of the expected maximum utility function when random utilities follow a multivariate extreme value distribution. For this reason it seems appropriate to call them MEV models ([Fosgerau et al., 2013](#)) rather than GEV models. The family of MEV models comprises the multinomial and the nested logit models as the simplest cases, but it is smaller than the family of ARUM. [McFadden \(1978\)](#) created examples of MEV models applying a nesting device to utilities; in the present paper we create examples by applying a nesting device to market shares.

[Fudenberg et al. \(2014\)](#) analyzes utility of the same form as used in this paper, but where the entropy term $\Omega(q)$ is separable as a sum of terms $f_j(q_j)$. It is crucial for the present results not to require such separability. [Mattsson and Weibull \(2002\)](#) have a similar setup, but where $\Omega(q)$ is interpreted as an implementation cost and with axioms imposed that essentially reduce $\Omega(q)$ to the Shannon entropy such that demand arises that is consistent with the logit model. This paper uses flexible entropy to describe substitution patterns that go well beyond those of logit and indeed nested logit. The budget set for the consumer in this paper incorporates a quantity constraint and is hence not linear in income and prices. This fits into the framework of [Fosgerau and McFadden \(2012\)](#) who develop a micro-economic theory of consumer demand under general budgets and where utility is perturbed by a linear term such as $q \cdot v$.

The next section first defines a class of direct utility models for market shares based on flexible entropy and derives the corresponding demand. Next, results are presented that allows members of this class to be constructed and some examples are given. Section 3 provides two illustrative applications, and shows how utility parameters may be recovered from market level data using standard regression techniques. Section 4 shows that all ARUM are represented by flexible entropy via duality. Section 5 presents a fixed point iteration that converges to the proba-

bility vector associated with utility levels v in a discrete choice setting and applies this in an example of maximum likelihood estimation using microdata of discrete choices. Section 6 concludes. Proofs not given in the text are in the appendix.

2 Direct utility models for market shares

2.1 Notational conventions

Vectors are denoted simply as $q = (q_1, \dots, q_J)$. A univariate function applied to a vector is understood as coordinate-wise application of the function, e.g., $e^q = (e^{q_1}, \dots, e^{q_J})$. The multivariate function $S : \mathbb{R}^J \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^J$ is composed of univariate functions with superscripts (j) : $S(q) = (S^{(1)}(q), \dots, S^{(J)}(q))$. Subscripts denote partial derivatives, e.g., $\frac{\partial G(v)}{\partial v_j} = G_j(v)$. A dot indicates an inner product or products of vectors and matrixes. Gradient with respect to vector v is ∇_v . The unit simplex in \mathbb{R}^J is Δ .

2.2 Consumer demand

Consider a representative consumer with income y facing a price vector p for J varieties of a differentiated good. The consumer maximizes utility $z + q \cdot a + \Omega(q)$ under the budget constraint $y \geq z + q \cdot p$ and the quantity constraint $\sum_j q_j = 1$.

Substituting the budget constraint leads to utility

$$u(q, y) = y + q \cdot v + \Omega(q), \quad (1)$$

where $v = a - p$.

We begin by giving an abstract formulation of Ω ; specific examples will be provided afterwards. *Flexible entropy* is a function $\Omega : [0, \infty)^J \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$ given by

$$\Omega(q) = \begin{cases} -q \cdot \ln S(q), & q \in \Delta \\ -\infty, & q \notin \Delta \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where the function $S : [0, \infty)^J \rightarrow [0, \infty)^J$ is a *flexible generator*, defined next. A function S is a *flexible generator* if it satisfies the following four conditions.

Condition 1 S is continuous, and homogenous of degree 1.

Condition 2 Ω is concave.

Condition 3 For any $q \in \Delta$ and $k \in \{1, \dots, J\}$, S is differentiable at q with

$$\sum_{j=1}^J q_j \frac{\partial \ln S^{(j)}(q)}{\partial q_k} = 1.$$

Condition 4 S is invertible.

Note that the definition of flexible entropy embodies the constraint that demands q_j sum to 1.¹ Throughout the paper, we denote the inverse of a flexible generator S by $H \equiv S^{-1}$.

If, as in [Fudenberg et al. \(2014\)](#), each component $S^{(j)}$ of a flexible generator depends only on q_j , then Condition 3 reduces to $\frac{\partial \ln S^{(j)}(q_j)}{\partial q_j} = 1/q_j$, which is a differential equation with solution $S^{(j)}(q_j) = cq_j, c > 0$. The function $S(q) = cq$ satisfies Conditions 1-4 and the corresponding flexible entropy $\Omega(q)$ is the Shannon entropy $-q \cdot \ln q$ plus a constant. Maximizing utility $u(q, y) = y + q \cdot v - q \cdot \ln q - \ln c$ under the quantity constraint $\sum_j q_j = 1$ leads to logit demand

$$q(v) = \left(\frac{e^{v_1}}{\sum_{j=1}^J e^{v_j}}, \dots, \frac{e^{v_J}}{\sum_{j=1}^J e^{v_j}} \right).$$

In general, each $S^{(j)}$ depends on the whole vector q ; the conditions on S are sufficient to derive a general expression for the demand.

Theorem 1 Let Ω be a flexible entropy. Maximization of utility (1) leads to a demand system with interior solution

$$q(v) = \left(\frac{H^{(1)}(e^v)}{\sum_{j=1}^J H^{(j)}(e^v)}, \dots, \frac{H^{(J)}(e^v)}{\sum_{j=1}^J H^{(j)}(e^v)} \right), \quad (3)$$

where $H = S^{-1}$.

The formulation of flexible entropy does not rule out corner solutions in general, since $s \ln s$ tends to 0 as s tends to 0. Whether zero demands can arise depends on the specific formulation of flexible entropy.

As we have seen, the form (3) of demand generalizes the logit demand. We shall establish in Section 4 that for any ARUM there is a flexible entropy that leads to the same demand. We shall also show in Theorem 3 that flexible entropies exist that are not consistent with ARUM demand.

¹We will show (in Theorem 4) that the convex conjugate of the ARUM surplus function has this form.

The homogeneity of H leads to the following easy but useful result.

Theorem 2 *Demand q corresponds to v in (3) if and only if $v = \ln S(q) + c$ for some $c \in \mathbb{R}$.*

Theorem 2 establishes that utility can be computed up to a constant directly from demand, given a flexible generator S . This result is used in Section 3, which discusses estimation of these models via regression.

Given v , unnormalized demand \tilde{q} can be found by solving $v = \ln S(\tilde{q})$. Due to the homogeneity of S , we can then find normalized demand as $q = \tilde{q} / (1 \cdot \tilde{q})$, which satisfies $v = \ln S(q) - \ln(1 \cdot \tilde{q})$.

The flexible entropy model extends to the case where the vector v is random with each consumer having some realization of v . Then demand conditional on v still has the form (3) and the expected demand is the expectation of (3). This is analogous to the mixed logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000). Moreover, both in the present case and in the mixed logit, the presence of the expectation implies that the explicit inversion in Theorem 2 does not carry through when v is random. The mixed logit model has been used to obtain less restrictive substitution patterns than those of the logit and nested logit models (Anderson et al., 1992). The next section provides a range of tractable new models that allow a great variety of substitution patterns without requiring the use of random parameters.

Utility is a linear function plus a concave function of demand. Fosgerau and McFadden (2012) analyze this type of utility and prove the result stated in the next proposition. It relies on the observation that for vectors v^k and v^{k-1} we have by utility maximization that

$$q(v^{k-1}) \cdot v^k + \Omega(q(v^{k-1})) \leq q(v^k) \cdot v^k + \Omega(q(v^k)).$$

Consider then a cycle of vectors of length $K \geq 1$, i.e. a finite sequence $\{v^k\}_1^{K+1}$ where $v^1 = v^{K+1}$. For notational convenience we identify also $v^0 = v^K$. Summing the inequalities over the cycle, the flexible entropy terms cancel and we obtain

$$\sum_{k=1}^K q(v^k) \cdot v^{k+1} = \sum_{k=1}^K q(v^{k-1}) \cdot v^k \leq \sum_{k=1}^K q(v^k) \cdot v^k,$$

which is (4), the first statement of Proposition 1. The second statement of the proposition follows from applying (4) to v^1 and v^2 , where $v_j^2 > v_j^1$ for some j and $v_i^1 = v_i^2$ for $i \neq j$.

Proposition 1 (Cyclical monotonicity) *If $\{v^k\}_1^{K+1}$, $K \geq 1$ is a finite sequence*

of vectors with $v^{K+j} = v^j$, then

$$\sum_{k=1}^K (v^{k+1} - v^k) \cdot q(v^k) \leq 0. \quad (4)$$

Each demand function $q_j(v)$ is positive and weakly increasing in $v_j, j = 1, \dots, J$.

The inequality (4) is a cyclical monotonicity condition (Rockafellar, 1970, chap. 24) and it guarantees that demand is contained in the subdifferential of a convex function.

2.3 Construction of direct utility functions

We have already identified one flexible generator, namely the identity $S(q) = q$. The following four subsections provide ways to generate many more flexible generators via nesting of alternatives and averaging of flexible generators. The results are illustrated with examples. The main obstacle that we face is to establish invertibility of candidate flexible generators. Ruzhansky and Sugimoto (2014) prove a global inversion theorem for homogeneous maps that we adapt into the following lemma.

Lemma 1 (Ruzhansky and Sugimoto, 2014) *Let $J \geq 3$ and let $S: (0, \infty)^J \rightarrow (0, \infty)^J$ be continuously differentiable, linearly homogenous with a Jacobian determinant that never vanishes and with $\inf_{q \in \Delta} \|S(q)\| > 0$. Then S is invertible.*

In the examples below we will see ways to construct functions that satisfy Conditions 1-3. In order for these functions to be flexible generators, it then remains to ensure that they are invertible. The next lemma establishes conditions under which the weighted geometric average of such functions, where just one of them must itself a flexible generator, leads to a new flexible generator.

Lemma 2 *Let $T_1, \dots, T_K : (0, \infty)^J \rightarrow (0, \infty)^J$ satisfy Conditions 1-3, where the Jacobian of each $\ln T_k$ is symmetric and positive semidefinite and positive definite for at least one k . If $T_k^{(j)}(q) \geq q_j$ for each k and j and $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_K$ are positive numbers that sum to 1, then $S: (0, \infty)^J \rightarrow (0, \infty)^J$ given by*

$$S = \prod_{k=1}^K T_k^{\alpha_k}$$

is a flexible generator.

As a consequence, a mapping created by averaging the identity $T_1(q) = q$ with some T_2 that satisfies the conditions of the lemma except positive definiteness is always invertible and hence it is a flexible generator.




Figure 1: Nesting example with 9 goods and 7 nests.

2.3.1 General nesting

Proposition 2 presents first a general construction of flexible generators through a nesting operation. A nest g is a set of goods for which a term $\left(\sum_{i \in g} q_i\right)^{\mu_g}$ enters the entropy component of utility, where $\mu_g \in]0, 1]$ is a nesting parameter. The closer μ_g is to 1, the more the goods in nest g act in the utility as one single good and they become closer to being perfect substitutes. The division of alternatives into nests is illustrated in Figure 1. As the figure shows, one alternative may belong in several nests, and nests may or may not be subsets of other nests. Proposition 2 requires that the nesting parameters sum to 1, summed across the nests that contain any given of the J goods.²

Proposition 2 (General nesting) *Let nests $g \in \mathcal{G}$ be subsets of the set of alterna-*

²In the example this may be achieved by letting $\mu_1 = \mu_3 = \mu_6 = \mu > 0$ and $\mu_2 = \mu_4 = \mu_5 = \mu_7 = 1 - \mu > 0$.

tives $\{1, \dots, J\}$. Let $S = (S^{(1)}, \dots, S^{(J)})$ be given by

$$S^{(j)}(q) = \prod_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \left(\sum_{i \in g} q_i \right)^{\mu_g}, \quad (5)$$

where $\sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \mu_g = 1$ for all j and $\mu_g > 0$ for all $g \in \mathcal{G}$. Then S satisfies Conditions 1-3. Moreover, the Jacobian of $\ln S$ is symmetric and positive semi-definite, and for each j , $S^{(j)}(q) \geq q_j$. If the Jacobian of $\ln S$ is positive definite, then S has an inverse and S is a flexible generator.

As an example of the application of Proposition 2, consider $J \geq 3$ with all possible nests with 1 or 2 alternatives as elements, e.g. for $J = 3$:

$$\mathcal{G} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}.$$

Each alternative belongs to J nests and we let $\mu_g = 1/J$. Define in accordance with (5) the function S by

$$S^{(j)}(q) = q_j^{\frac{1}{J}} \prod_{i \neq j} (q_i + q_j)^{\frac{1}{J}}.$$

By Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 this is a flexible generator. The demand solves $S(q) = e^{v-c}$ for some $c \in \mathbb{R}$, we have no explicit expression for this.

2.3.2 Simple nesting

We shall now consider a special case of Proposition 2 that leads to demand corresponding to the nested logit model. Partition the set of alternatives $\{1, \dots, J\}$ into nests $g \in \mathcal{G}$ and denote by g_j the nest that contains alternative j . Let

$$S^{(j)}(q) = q_j^{\mu_{g_j}} \left(\sum_{i \in g_j} q_i \right)^{1-\mu_{g_j}}, \quad j \in g_j, \quad (6)$$

where $\mu_{g_j} \in]0, 1]$ are parameters. Then S is a flexible generator by Proposition 2 with Lemma 2 ensuring invertibility of S . It is straightforward to verify that the equation $S(\tilde{q}) = e^v$ has solution

$$\tilde{q}_j = e^{\frac{v_j}{\mu_{g_j}}} \left(\sum_{i \in g_j} e^{\frac{v_i}{\mu_{g_j}}} \right)^{\mu_{g_j}-1}.$$

Normalizing the sum of demands to 1 leads to

$$q_j = \frac{\tilde{q}_j}{\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \sum_{k \in g} \tilde{q}_k} = \frac{e^{\frac{v_j}{\mu_{gj}}}}{\sum_{i \in g_j} e^{\frac{v_i}{\mu_{gj}}}} \frac{e^{\mu_{gj} \ln \left(\sum_{i \in g_j} e^{\frac{v_i}{\mu_{gj}}} \right)}}{e^{\mu_g \ln \left(\sum_{i \in g} e^{\frac{v_i}{\mu_g}} \right)}},$$

which is a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978).³

2.3.3 Cross-nesting

We shall now use the general nesting result of Proposition 2 to create a cross-nested model, which generalizes the nested logit model. Let us say that a set of products can be naturally grouped according to two criteria, where one grouping is not a subdivision of the other. For example, automobiles may be grouped according to brand or according to body type. We shall create a structure that is similar to the nested logit model, but which, unlike the nested logit model, allows for non-nested groupings.⁴ In this example, we also include an outside good, with index zero.

Proposition 3 (Cross-nesting) *Let $\mu_0, \mu_1, \mu_2 > 0$, $\mu_0 + \mu_1 + \mu_2 = 1$. Let $\sigma_c(j)$ be the set of products that are grouped together with product j on criteria $c = 1, 2$. Denote $I_c(j) = \sum_{i \in \sigma_c(j)} q_i$ and define S by*

$$S^{(j)}(q) = \begin{cases} q_0, & j = 0 \\ q_j^{\mu_0} I_1(j)^{\mu_1} I_2(j)^{\mu_2}, & j > 0. \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

Then S is a flexible generator.

Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemma 2 combined with Proposition 2. No explicit expression for the associated demand is available. The cross-nesting model is applied in Section 3.1.

2.3.4 Invertible nesting

The next proposition provides a case that goes beyond averaging of simple nesting flexible generators and where the inversion can be carried out explicitly.

³Berry (1994) noticed the explicit inversion of the nested logit demand and used inversion of market shares to estimate utility parameters using standard regression techniques. Verboven (1996) used the same inversion when deriving nested logit demand for a representative consumer.

⁴With only the nested logit model available, researchers have been forced to choose a hierarchy of criteria, for example first grouping cars by make and then by body type within each make. With cross-nesting, it is not necessary to fix such hierarchy.

Proposition 4 (Invertible nesting) *Let S be given by (5), where the number of nests is equal to the number of alternatives. Let $W = \text{diag}(\mu_{g_1}, \dots, \mu_{g_J})$ be a diagonal matrix of nesting parameters and let $M_{J \times J} = \{1_{\{j \in g\}}\}$ be an incidence matrix, where rows correspond to alternatives and columns correspond to nests. Suppose that M is invertible. Then S has an inverse and S is a flexible generator. Moreover, unnormalized demand satisfies*

$$v = \ln S(\tilde{q}) \Leftrightarrow \tilde{q} = (M^\top)^{-1} \exp(W^{-1} M^{-1} v).$$

As an example, consider $J \geq 3$ and define nests from the symmetric incidence matrix M with entries $M_{ij} = 1_{\{i \neq j\}}$. Then each alternative is in $J - 1$ nests and we may associate weights $\mu_g = 1/(J - 1)$ with each nest. The inverse of the incidence matrix has entries $(M^{-1})_{ij} = \frac{1}{J-1} - 1_{\{i=j\}}$. Solving $\ln S(\tilde{q}) = v$ leads to

$$\tilde{q} = M^{-1} \exp[(J - 1) M^{-1} v],$$

or equivalently

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{q}_i &= \sum_{j=1}^J \left(\frac{1}{J-1} - 1_{\{i=j\}} \right) \exp \left(\sum_{k=1}^J (1 - (J-1) 1_{\{k=j\}}) v_k \right) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^J \left(\frac{1}{J-1} - 1_{\{i=j\}} \right) \exp \left(\sum_{k=1}^J v_k \right) e^{-(J-1)v_j} \\ &= \exp \left(\sum_{k=1}^J v_k \right) \left(\frac{1}{J-1} \sum_{j=1}^J e^{-(J-1)v_j} - e^{-(J-1)v_i} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Normalized demand is then

$$q_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^J e^{-(J-1)v_j} - (J-1) e^{-(J-1)v_i}}{\sum_{j=1}^J e^{-(J-1)v_j}}.$$

This model looks similar to the multinomial logit but is different in important ways. First, it does not have the independence from irrelevant alternatives property. Second, zero demands may arise.⁵ The above expression for demand leads to non-negative demands only for values of v within some set. A way to ensure that demands are strictly positive is to average with a flexible generator such as the simple identity, since then $\ln q_j$ must all be finite.

Third, the demand from the invertible nesting model in the example is not consistent with any ARUM. ARUM demand has the restrictive feature that the

⁵Zero demands may also arise in an ARUM where the error terms have bounded support.

mixed partial derivatives of q_j alternate in sign (McFadden, 1981; Fosgerau et al., 2013). This feature is not exhibited by the demand generated in this example, since $\frac{\partial q_1}{\partial v_2} < 0$, $\frac{\partial^2 q_1}{\partial v_2 \partial v_3} < 0$.⁶ Thus, we have established the following theorem.

Theorem 3 *There exists a flexible entropy that leads to demand that is not consistent with any ARUM.*

In Section 4 we establish that all ARUM have a flexible entropy as counterpart that leads to the same demand.

The signs of the mixed partial derivatives of a quantity with respect to the prices of other goods vary in the same way also for CES demand under the standard linear budget constraint when CES utility is $u(x) = \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha_j x_j^\gamma$, $\alpha_j > 0$, $\gamma \in (0, 1)$. It is thus possible for a well-behaved utility function that the signs of the mixed partial derivatives of q_j are not consistent with those predicated by ARUM.

3 Estimation of flexible entropy models

We shall now see how flexible generators may be used to estimate market share models in a way similar to Berry (1994). Berry starts from the perspective of a discrete choice model and inverts market shares to determine utility levels (up to a constant) associated with a set of products in a number of markets. These utility levels form the basis for a regression where IV techniques may be used to deal with endogeneity, notably occurring if there are unobserved quality attributes that are correlated with prices. Here we shall exploit Theorem 2, which delivers utility levels (up to a constant) as a flexible generator applied to a vector of market shares. Models specified in terms of flexible generators thus circumvent the need to invert market shares numerically, while offering the opportunity to use functional forms that generalize the nested logit model.

Let us consider a market with J products and an outside good. The market share q_j of product j depends only on utility levels $v = (v_1, \dots, v_J)$, where $v_j = z_j \cdot \beta + \xi_j$. The ξ_j is an unobserved demand characteristic of product j , which is mean independent of z and independent across markets, z_j is a vector of variables and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The utility of the outside good is normalized as $v_0 = 0$. Assume further that demand given v is (3), where H is the inverse of a flexible generator S . Then, by Theorem 2, we have $\ln S(q) = v + c$,

⁶Note that $\frac{\partial q_1}{\partial v_2} = -(J-1)^2 e^{-(J-1)(v_1+v_2)} \left(\sum_{j=1}^J e^{-(J-1)v_j} \right)^{-2} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 q_1}{\partial v_2 \partial v_3} = -2(J-1)^3 e^{-(J-1)(v_1+v_2+v_3)} \left(\sum_{j=1}^J e^{-(J-1)v_j} \right)^{-3} < 0$.

where $c \in \mathbb{R}$, or equivalently.

$$\ln S^{(j)}(q) - \ln S^{(0)}(q) = z_j \cdot \beta + \xi_j. \quad (8)$$

Given a specific form for S , (8) may be estimated using linear regression techniques. Given suitable instruments, it is possible to allow for endogeneity of some of the variables in z_j . Here we shall focus on the estimation of the parameters in $\ln S^{(j)}$. We shall provide two examples: the first has a cross-nested structure, the second has an ordered structure.

3.1 A cross-nested model for market shares

We consider the cross-nesting example of Proposition 3. Cross-nesting is appropriate if there are several dimensions along which products may be similar and closer substitutes for each other. We have mentioned the example of automobiles.

Insert (7) into (8), rearrange slightly and reparametrize using $\tilde{\beta} = \frac{\beta}{\mu_0}$, $\tilde{\mu}_1 = \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_0}$, $\tilde{\mu}_2 = \frac{\mu_2}{\mu_0}$, $\delta = \frac{1}{\mu_0}$, $\tilde{\xi}_j = \frac{1}{\mu_0} \xi_j$ to obtain the equation

$$\ln q_j = z_j \cdot \tilde{\beta} - \tilde{\mu}_1 \ln \left(\sum_{i \in \sigma_1(j)} q_i \right) - \tilde{\mu}_2 \ln \left(\sum_{i \in \sigma_2(j)} q_i \right) + \delta \ln q_0 + \tilde{\xi}_j. \quad (9)$$

This can be estimated by regression treating $\ln \left(\sum_{i \in \sigma_1(j)} q_i \right)$, $\ln \left(\sum_{i \in \sigma_2(j)} q_i \right)$ and $\ln q_0$ as endogenous. Potential instruments include characteristics of products i that share nests with product j as well as the sum of characteristics over all products.

We have simulated data for this model using a cross-nested structure as shown in Figure 2. There are three by three alternatives and an outside option. There is one explanatory variable z_j , which is standard normal. Unobserved characteristics $\tilde{\xi}_j$ are standard normal multiplied by a factor 1/2. We set $(\beta, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (1, 0.1, 0.4)$, such that there is both a small and a larger nesting parameter. True regression parameters become these divided by $1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2$. The market shares (q_0, q_1, \dots, q_9) corresponding to each draw of (z_1, \dots, z_9) and $(\tilde{\xi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\xi}_9)$ are determined by solving numerically the utility maximization problem in Theorem 1. We have generated 1000 datasets with 100 observations in each, where one observation consists of vectors (q_0, q_1, \dots, q_9) and (z_1, \dots, z_9) .

For each dataset we estimate the regression (9) using instrumental variable (IV) regression with instruments $1, z_j, \sum_{i \in \sigma_1(j)} z_i, \sum_{i \in \sigma_2(j)} z_i, \sum_i z_i$ and squares of these. These instruments correlate with the endogenous variables and are independent of the noise term by construction of the data. F-statistics for the




Figure 2: Cross-nested structure of model in the simulation example, with 3 by 3 products and an outside option 0.

Table 1: Parameter estimates in simulation with cross-nested model

	β	$-\tilde{\mu}_1$	$-\tilde{\mu}_2$	δ
True parameters	2	-0.2	-0.8	2
Avg. IV estimates	2.00	-0.20	-0.79	1.99
Std.dev.	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.06
Avg. OLS estimates	1.76	0.10	-0.41	1.59
Std.dev.	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05

excluded instruments in the first-stage regression range mostly above 100 for $\ln \left(\sum_{i \in \sigma_1(j)} q_i \right)$ and $\ln \left(\sum_{i \in \sigma_2(j)} q_i \right)$. For $\ln q_0$, F-statistics are lower but still with average around 100 and minimum above 30.

Table 1 summarizes the simulation. The average of the IV estimates is close to the true values; the corresponding standard deviations may be considered small considering that each dataset only has 100 observations. The average OLS estimates are all more than two standard deviations from their true values, which indicates that the instruments play a significant role in the IV estimation.

3.2 An ordered model for market shares

The cross-nested model that we estimated in the previous section is among the simplest of the new models that we can create using flexible generators. Many more models can be created using Proposition 2. We shall now present an example where there is an ordering among products such that products that are nearer each other in the ordering are closer substitutes.

Products $1, \dots, J$ are ordered in sequence. For simplicity, the ordering is circular such that there are no endpoints. There is an outside option 0 with market share q_0 . Define a flexible generator S by

$$S^{(j)}(q) = \begin{cases} q_0, & j = 0 \\ q_j^{\mu_0} I_{j1}^{\mu_1}(j) I_{j2}^{\mu_1}(j) I_{j3}^{\mu_1}(j), & j > 0, \end{cases}$$

where $I_1(j) = q_{j-2} + q_{j-1} + q_j$, $I_2(j) = q_{j-1} + q_j + q_{j+1}$, $I_3(j) = q_j + q_{j+1} + q_{j+2}$ and parameters μ_i are positive and sum to 1. This is a flexible generator by Lemma 2 and Proposition 2. The structure is illustrated in Figure 3. There is a nest for any triple of neighboring products and each product is then in three nests. Then each product has its immediate neighbors as closest substitute and next neighbors as less close substitutes.

As before we simulated 1000 datasets from this model with 100 observations in each dataset. Variables z_j and $\tilde{\xi}_j$ are again respectively $N(0, 1)$ and $0.5 \cdot N(0, 1)$. We estimate the regression,

$$\begin{aligned} \ln q_j = & z_j \cdot \tilde{\beta} - \tilde{\mu}_1 \ln \left(\sum_{j-2 \leq i \leq j} q_i \right) - \tilde{\mu}_2 \ln \left(\sum_{j-1 \leq k \leq j+1} q_i \right) \\ & - \tilde{\mu}_3 \ln \left(\sum_{j \leq k \leq j+2} q_i \right) + \delta \ln q_0 + \tilde{\xi}_j, \end{aligned}$$

using the same transformation of parameters as before. Note that we allow for three different values of $\tilde{\mu}_i$, although they all have the same true value $\tilde{\mu}_i = \mu_1/\mu_0$. As instruments we use $1, z_j, \sum_{j-2 \leq i \leq j} z_i, \sum_{j-1 \leq k \leq j+1} z_i, \sum_{j \leq k \leq j+2} z_i$ as well as squares of these variables. F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression are again very high.

Estimation results are summarized in Table 2. As before, the average of the IV estimates is close to the true value. The corresponding standard errors again seem small, considering that the datasets only have 100 observations. The average OLS estimates are again all more than two standard deviations from their true values, indicating again the necessity of accounting for endogeneity in the regression.




Figure 3: Ordered structure of model in simulation example products and an outside option

Table 2: Parameter estimates in simulation with ordered model

	β	$-\tilde{\mu}_1$	$-\tilde{\mu}_2$	$-\tilde{\mu}_3$	δ
True parameters	2.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	2.50
Avg. IV estimates	2.49	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	2.49
Std.dev.	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Avg. OLS estimates	2.16	-0.10	-0.36	-0.10	1.91
Std.dev.	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06

4 Discrete choice and flexible entropy

According to Theorem 3 there exists a flexible entropy that leads to a demand system that is not consistent with any ARUM. This section establishes that the class of demand systems (3) that can be created using flexible entropy includes all demands systems derived from ARUM. The class of flexible entropy demands is thus strictly larger than the class of ARUM demands.

We consider ARUM with utilities $v_j + \varepsilon_j, j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$, where the joint distribution of $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_J)$ is absolutely continuous with finite means and independent of v . Suppose for simplicity that ε is supported on all of \mathbb{R}^J . Each consumer draws a realization of ε and chooses the alternative with the maximum utility. The expected maximum utility is denoted

$$G(v) = E \max_j \{v_j + \varepsilon_j\}. \quad (10)$$

We denote the vector of choice probabilities as $P(v) = (P_1(v), \dots, P_J(v))$. It is well known that $P(v) = \nabla G(v)$ (McFadden, 1981). Choice probabilities are all everywhere positive since ε has full support. Let ε^* be the residual of the maximum utility alternative. The following lemma collects some properties of G and ε^* .

Lemma 3 *The function G is convex and finite everywhere, hence it is continuous and closed. Furthermore, G has the homogeneity property that $G(v + c) = G(v) + c$ for any $c \in \mathbb{R}$, and G is twice continuously differentiable. G is given in terms of the expected residual of the maximum utility alternative by*

$$G(v) = P(v) \cdot v + E(\varepsilon^* | v).$$

Define

$$H(e^v) = \nabla_v (e^{G(v)}). \quad (11)$$

It follows directly from this definition that

$$\nabla G(v) = \frac{H(e^v)}{1 \cdot H(e^v)}. \quad (12)$$

In the case of the multinomial logit model, $G(v) = \ln \sum_{j=1}^J e^{v_j}$, $H(e^v) = e^v$, such that (12) is the well known expression for the probabilities of that model.

Lemma 4 is essentially the content of the appendix in Berry (1994). In contrast to Berry, the proof here does not rely on the existence of an outside option. It relies on Lemma 1, which allows it to be quite short.

Lemma 4 *The function H defined by $H(e^v) = \nabla_v(e^{G(v)})$ is invertible.*

The invertibility of H allows us to define

$$S(q) = H^{-1}(q). \quad (13)$$

Let

$$G^*(q) = \sup_v \{q \cdot v - G(v)\} \quad (14)$$

be the convex conjugate of G (Rockafellar, 1970, p. 104). Theorem 4 provides an explicit form for $G^*(q)$, which underlies the findings that we present below. The function $G^*(q)$ is finite only on the unit simplex Δ , the set of probability vectors.

Theorem 4 *The convex conjugate of the expected maximum utility $G(v)$ is*

$$G^*(q) = \begin{cases} q \cdot \ln S(q), & q \in \Delta \\ +\infty, & q \notin \Delta. \end{cases}$$

Moreover, $G(v) = \sup_q \{q \cdot v - G^*(q)\}$ and $E(\varepsilon^*|v) = -G^*(q)$ when $q = \nabla G(v)$.

When ε is an i.i.d. extreme value type 1 vector, then $G(v) = \ln(1 \cdot e^v)$, while $-G^*(q) = -q \cdot \ln q$ is the Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948). This shows that $-G^*(q)$ is a generalization of entropy. We shall explore some properties of this generalization.

The generalization of entropy $-G^*(q)$ is concave, since G^* is the convex conjugate of a convex function. It has maximum where $0 \in \partial G^*(q)$ or equivalently where $\partial G^*(q) = \{v|v = (c, \dots, c), c \in \mathbb{R}\}$. Hence it is maximal at the probability vector corresponding to vectors v that are constant across choice alternatives in the ARUM and do not affect the discrete choice. This is consistent with the interpretation of entropy as a measure of the expected surprise associated with a distribution.

The Shannon entropy is always positive. The generalization of entropy $-G^*(q)$ may take any value, but it is necessarily positive when the random components have zero mean - this is a direct consequence of Jensen's inequality.

Proposition 5 *If $E(\varepsilon_j) = 0$ for all j in an ARUM, then the corresponding generalized entropy is always non-negative: $-G^*(q) \geq 0, q \in \Delta$.*

We now turn to establishing the relation between ARUM and flexible entropy. The following two lemmas are used to show that a function S derived from an ARUM is a flexible generator as defined in Section 2.

Lemma 5 *The function $S = H^{-1}$ is continuous and homogenous of degree 1.*

Lemma 6 *The function $S = H^{-1}$ satisfies Condition 3.*

We note by Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 that an S derived from an ARUM via (13) is a flexible generator. The ARUM demand (12) is the same as the demand (3) resulting from maximization of utility (1). Then, by Theorem 4, we have proved the following theorem.

Theorem 5 *Let G^* be the convex conjugate of an ARUM surplus function $G(v) = E \max_j \{v_j + \varepsilon_j\}$. Then $-G^*$ is a flexible entropy. The ARUM demand equals the utility maximizing demand in Theorem 1.*

Section 2.3.4 provided an example of a flexible entropy that is not the convex conjugate of an ARUM surplus function.

5 Application to discrete choice data

We shall consider how to apply the flexible entropy model to microdata with observations of discrete choices. Such data are commonly available and provide the opportunity for incorporating individual specific information. The associated cost is that it is not possible to estimate microdata models merely by regression in the same way as with market level data. This section demonstrates the feasibility of estimation by maximum likelihood.

We take as a starting point that individuals choose good j with probability q_j satisfying $v = \ln S(q) + c$ for some flexible generator S and with $c \in \mathbb{R}$ ensuring that probabilities sum to 1. If the flexible entropy in utility (1) is the convex conjugate of an ARUM surplus function, then q are simply the corresponding discrete choice probabilities. Flexible entropies that are not ARUM consistent may still correspond to nonadditive random utility models, i.e. models where utilities are not just sums but more general functions of v_j and ε_j (Matzkin, 2007). Alternatively, individuals could be seen as making random choices with probabilities that are the result of utility maximization (Fudenberg et al., 2014).

We will consider estimation by maximum likelihood. This requires us to compute the likelihood q given v and we hence need a way to invert S that is feasible within a maximum likelihood routine. The following theorem indicates how the likelihood may be computed by using an iterative process to solve a fixed point problem. We use the Kullback and Leibler (1951) distance function to evaluate the distance from the fixed point r to some q :

$$d_r(q) = r \cdot \ln \left(\frac{r}{q} \right).$$

This is a convex function with minimum at r with $d_r(r) = 0$. Hence $d_r(q)$ will be larger the further q is from r .

Theorem 6 *Let S be the flexible generator defined in Proposition 2 and let $r \in \Delta$ satisfy $v = \ln S(r) + c$ for some $c \in \mathbb{R}$. Then the mapping*

$$w(q) = \left\{ \frac{q_i e^{v_i} / S^{(i)}(q)}{\sum_j q_j e^{v_j} / S^{(j)}(q)} \right\} \quad (15)$$

has r as unique fixed point and iteration of (15) from any starting point in Δ converges to r .

If S has the form

$$S^{(j)}(q) = q_j^{\mu_0} \prod_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g, g \neq \{j\}\}} \left(\sum_{i \in g} q_i \right)^{\mu_g} \quad (16)$$

for some $\mu_0 > 0$, then $d_r(w(q)) \leq (1 - \mu_0) d_r(q)$.

Theorem 6 then shows that iteration of (15) will always converge to the fixed point. Intuitively, the numerator of (15) adjusts each q_i in the direction that makes $v = \ln S(q) + c$ true, while the denominator ensures that $1 \cdot w(q) = 1$. The second half of the theorem concerns the special case when the flexible generator is an average of the identity with something else. Beginning from q^0 and iterating such that $q^n = w(q^{n-1})$, $n \geq 1$ the theorem shows that $d_r(q^n) \leq (1 - \mu_0)^n d_r(q^0)$, which means that the distance to the fixed point decreases exponentially

A question is now how well it is possible to recover parameters underlying utility from the observation of discrete choices. We have investigated this in a simulation experiment where we have simulated data from the cross-nested structure of Section 3.1. We do not include the outside option as we have a situation in mind where we observe the choices of people who buy one of the varieties of some good under consideration. Utilities are specified as $v_j = \alpha x_{1j} + \beta x_{1j} x_2$, where x_{1j} represents an alternative specific characteristic, while x_2 represents individual specific variation. We performed 100 replications with 1000 individuals in each, each individual selects 1 among the 9 alternatives in the model with probabilities q , where $\ln S(q) = v + c$. The independent variables were generated as i.i.d. standard normal. The likelihood was computed using Theorem 6 and was maximized numerically.⁷ The results are summarized in Table 3. As in the previous simulation exercises in this paper, we find that the true parameters are well recovered.

⁷Using BFGS with numerical derivatives.

Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates in discrete choice simulation with cross-nested model

	α	β	μ_1	μ_2
True parameters	0.500	0.500	0.200	0.500
Avg. estimates	0.498	0.498	0.208	0.495
Std.dev.	0.050	0.050	0.043	0.055

6 Concluding remarks

This paper has introduced the concepts of flexible entropy and flexible generators and used them to derive a general family of demand systems. General rules for constructing demand systems have been provided along with some specific examples and it has been shown how these models may be estimated using either market share or individual level data.

We believe that flexible entropy models may be useful in a range of circumstances. One example that we have mentioned is the demand for automobiles (e.g. [Berry et al., 1995](#); [Goldberg and Verboven, 2001](#); [Train and Winston, 2007](#)). The number of varieties of new cars is large and there are likely complex substitution patterns that may be accounted for using flexible generators. Another application area characterized by a large number of alternative "products" is spatial models, where flexible generators may be used to describe spatial correlations, for example in models of equilibrium sorting ([Kuminoff et al., 2013](#)). We hope that the family of demand systems provided here will stimulate future empirical work.

The nesting device we use to create flexible generators does not exhaust all possibilities. There is thus scope for finding more flexible generators with properties that may be useful in specific circumstances. One possibility that we have not explored, for example, is to combine our nesting device with the idea that membership of a nest may be partial.

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A Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1. Form the Lagrangian

$$\Lambda(q, \lambda) = y + q \cdot v - q \cdot \ln S(q) + \lambda(1 - 1 \cdot q).$$

The first-order conditions for (q_1, \dots, q_J) are

$$0 = \frac{\partial \Lambda}{\partial q_k} = v_k - \ln S^{(k)}(q) - \sum_{j=1}^J q_j \frac{d \ln S^{(j)}(q)}{dq_k} - \lambda,$$

resulting by Condition 3 in

$$S(q) = e^{v-1-\lambda} > 0.$$

The homogeneity of S implies homogeneity of $H = S^{-1}$ and then

$$q = H(e^{v-1-\lambda}) = e^{-(1+\lambda)} H(e^v).$$

The constraint $1 \cdot q = 1$ implies that $e^{1+\lambda} = 1 \cdot H(e^v)$ such that any solution to the first-order conditions satisfies

$$q = \frac{H(e^v)}{1 \cdot H(e^v)} \tag{17}$$

and thus q is uniquely determined.

Existence of a solution is established as follows: Existence can fail only if the denominator in (17) is zero; but the $H^{(j)}(e^v)$ are non-negative so this can only occur if $H^{(j)}(e^v) = 0$ for all j ; this implies in turn by invertibility and homogeneity of S that $e^v = 0$, which is a contradiction. By Condition (2), the utility $u(q)$ is concave, and hence the solution (17) to the first-order conditions is a global maximum. ■

Proof of Theorem 2. If q is an interior solution to the utility maximization problem then it satisfies equation (3), which implies that

$$\ln S(q) + \ln \left(\sum_{j=1}^J H^{(j)}(e^v) \right) = v.$$

Conversely, if $v = \ln S(q) + c$, then q solves (3). ■

Proof of Lemma 1. This follows from Theorem 2.4 in [Ruzhansky and Sugimoto](#)

(2014) upon noting that S may be extended to

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} S(x), & x \in (0, \infty)^J \\ x, & x \in \mathbb{R}^J \setminus (0, \infty)^J. \end{cases}$$

$A \equiv \mathbb{R}^J \setminus (0, \infty)^J$ is a closed set. f is C^1 on $\mathbb{R}^J \setminus A$ with $\det J_f \neq 0$ on $\mathbb{R}^J \setminus A$. f is continuous and injective on A and $\mathbb{R}^J \setminus f(A)$ is simply connected. It is also the case that $f(\mathbb{R}^J \setminus A) \subset \mathbb{R}^J \setminus f(A)$. Let $\{x_n\} \subseteq (0, \infty)^J$ with $\|x_n\| \rightarrow \infty$. Then $\|S(x_n)\| = \|x_n\| \left\| S\left(\frac{x_n}{\|x_n\|}\right) \right\| \geq \|x_n\| \inf_{q \in \Delta} S(q) \rightarrow \infty$. Then f satisfies the conditions in the [Ruzhansky and Sugimoto \(2014\)](#) theorem and thus S is invertible. ■

Proof of Lemma 2. Conditions 1-3 are easily verified. We shall verify that T is invertible using Lemma 1. Since $T_k^{(j)}(q) \geq q_j$, also $S^{(j)}(q) \geq q_j$, and then $\inf_q \|S(q)\| \geq J^{-1} > 0$, which is the first requirement in Lemma 1.

The Jacobian of $\ln S$ is

$$J_{\ln S} = \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k J_{\ln T_k}.$$

Then $J_{\ln S}$ is positive definite and hence its determinant is positive. The Jacobian $J_S = \text{diag} \{S^{(1)}(q)^{-1}, \dots, S^{(J)}(q)^{-1}\} \cdot J_{\ln S}$ also has positive determinant, which is the second requirement in Lemma 1. ■

Proof of Proposition 2. (General nesting) Condition 1 follows directly. Condition 2 follows by noting that $\Omega(q)$ is a linear combination of functions of the type $-t \ln t$ and that $t \rightarrow -t \ln t$ is strictly concave when $t > 0$. Finally, denoting $q_g = \sum_{j \in g} q_j$,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{j=1}^J q_j \frac{d \ln S^{(j)}(q)}{dq_k} &= \sum_{j=1}^J q_j \frac{\sum_g \mu_g 1_{\{j \in g\}} 1_{\{k \in g\}} \partial \ln(q_g)}{\partial q_k} \\ &= \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \mu_g 1_{\{k \in g\}} \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{q_j 1_{\{j \in g\}}}{q_g} = 1 \end{aligned}$$

showing that Condition 3 holds as required.

We have

$$S^{(j)}(q) = \prod_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} \left(\sum_{i \in g} q_i \right)^{\mu_g} \geq \prod_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g\}} q_j^{\mu_g} = q_j.$$

The Jacobian of $\ln S$ has elements jk

$$\sum_{\{g \in \mathcal{G} | j \in g, k \in g\}} \mu_g \frac{1}{q_g},$$

such that it is symmetric and positive semidefinite. If it is positive definite, then by Lemma 2 S has an inverse and is a flexible generator. ■

Proof of Proposition 4. (Invertible nesting) Observe that (6) may be written in matrix form as $\ln S(q) = MW \ln(M^\top q)$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \ln S(q) &= v \Leftrightarrow \\ q &= (M^\top)^{-1} \exp(W^{-1} M^{-1} v). \end{aligned}$$

Hence S has an inverse and it follows from Proposition 2 that S is a flexible generator. ■

Proof of Lemma 3. Fosgerau et al. (2013) establishes convexity and finiteness of G as well as the homogeneity property and the existence of all mixed partial derivatives up to order J . This also implies that all second order mixed partial derivatives are continuous, since $J \geq 3$.

The existence of derivatives G_{ii} is established from the homogeneity property that $G_j(v+c) = G_j(v)$, $j = 1, \dots, J$. Consider G_{11} at no loss of generality and observe that

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{G_1(v_1+c, v_2, \dots, v_J) - G_1(v_1, v_2, \dots, v_J)}{c} \\ &= \frac{G_1(v_1, v_2-c, \dots, v_J-c) - G_1(v_1, v_2, \dots, v_J)}{c} \\ &\rightarrow_{c \rightarrow 0^+} - \sum_{j \neq 1} G_{1j}(v) = G_{11}(v), \end{aligned}$$

which means that G_{11} exists. Furthermore, $G_{1j}, j > 1$ are continuous and hence so is G_{11} .

Let $*$ be the index of the chosen alternative. The last statement of the lemma follows using the law of iterated expectations since

$$\begin{aligned} G(v) &= \sum_j E \left(\max_j \{v_j + \varepsilon_j\} | * = j, v \right) P_j(v) \\ &= \sum_j (v_j + E(\varepsilon^* | * = j, v)) P_j(v) \\ &= P(v) \cdot v + E(\varepsilon^* | v). \end{aligned}$$

■

Proof of Lemma 4. We shall make use of Lemma 1 applied to H . The Jacobian of $v \rightarrow H(e^v)$ is $\{e^{G(v)}G_i(v)G_j(v)\} + \{e^{G(v)}G_{ij}(v)\}$. The first matrix is positive definite since all choice probabilities are positive, the second matrix is positive semidefinite due to the convexity of G , hence this matrix is everywhere positive definite and then the Jacobian determinant of $v \rightarrow H(e^v)$ never vanishes. This implies in turn that the Jacobian determinant of the composition $y \rightarrow \ln y \rightarrow H(y)$ never vanishes. It remains to show that $\inf_{y \in \Delta} \|H(y)\| > 0$. But $y \in \Delta$ implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \|H(y)\| &= e^{G(\ln y)} \|\nabla G(\ln y)\| \\ &\geq e^{E \max_j \{\ln y_j + \varepsilon_j\}} J^{-1/2} \\ &\geq e^{\max_j \{\ln y_j + E\varepsilon_j\}} J^{-1/2} \\ &= \max_j \{y_j e^{E\varepsilon_j}\} J^{-1/2} \\ &\geq \|(y_1 e^{E\varepsilon_1}, \dots, y_J e^{E\varepsilon_J})\| J^{-1} \\ &\geq \left(\sum_{j=1}^J e^{-2E\varepsilon_j} \right)^{-1} J^{-1} > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where we first used that ∇G is on the unit simplex, second that the max operation is convex, third that the sup-norm bounds the euclidean norm, and fourth that the minimum of $\|(y_1 e^{E\varepsilon_1}, \dots, y_J e^{E\varepsilon_J})\|$ on the unit simplex is attained at $y_j = e^{-2E\varepsilon_j} \left(\sum_{k=1}^J e^{-2E\varepsilon_k} \right)^{-1}$, $j = 1, \dots, J$. ■

Proof of Theorem 4. We first evaluate $G^*(q)$. If $1 \cdot q \neq 1$, then

$$q \cdot (v + \gamma) - G(v + \gamma) = q \cdot v - G(v) + (1 \cdot q - 1) \gamma,$$

which can be made arbitrarily large by changing γ and hence $G^*(q) = \infty$. Next consider q with some $q_j < 0$. $G(v)$ decreases towards a lower bound denoted $G(-\infty, v_{-j})$ as $v_j \rightarrow -\infty$. Then $q \cdot v - G(v)$ increases towards $+\infty$ and hence G^* is $+\infty$ outside the unit simplex Δ .

For $q \in \Delta$, we solve the maximization problem (14) noting that we may fix $1 \cdot v = 0$. Maximize then the Lagrangian $q \cdot v - G(v) - \lambda(1 \cdot v)$ with first-order

conditions $0 = q_j - G_j(v) - \lambda$, which lead to $\lambda = 0$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} q &= \nabla_v G(v) \Leftrightarrow \\ q e^{G(v)} &= \nabla_v (e^{G(v)}) = H(e^v) \Leftrightarrow \\ S(q) e^{G(v)} &= e^v \Leftrightarrow \\ \ln S(q) + G(v) &= v \Rightarrow \\ q \cdot \ln S(q) + G(v) &= q \cdot v. \end{aligned}$$

Inserting this into (14) leads to the desired result.

G is convex and closed and hence G is the convex conjugate of G^* (Rockafellar, 1970, Thm. 12.2), this is the next assertion of the theorem. Finally, for $q = \nabla G(v)$, a fundamental result of convex analysis (Rockafellar, 1970, Thm. 23.5) states that $G(v) + G^*(q) = v \cdot q$, which may be combined with (10) to yield the final statement of the theorem. ■

Proof of Proposition 5. Note that the maximum is a convex function, such that Jensen's inequality applies. Then, for $q = \nabla G(v)$,

$$\begin{aligned} -G^*(q) &= E \max_j (v_j + \varepsilon_j) - v \cdot q \\ &\geq \max_j E(v_j + \varepsilon_j) - v \cdot q \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

■

Proof of Lemma 5. Continuity of S follows from continuity of the partial derivatives of G , which is immediate from the definition. Homogeneity of S is equivalent to homogeneity of H . Using the homogeneity property of G ,

$$S^{-1}(\lambda e^v) = \nabla_v (e^{G(v+\ln \lambda)}) = \lambda \nabla_v (e^{G(v)}) = \lambda S^{-1}(e^v),$$

which shows that H and hence S are homogenous of degree 1. ■

Proof of Lemma 6. The requirement that $\sum_{j=1}^J q_j \frac{d \ln S^{(j)}(q)}{dq_k} = 1$ may be expressed in matrix notation in terms of the Jacobian $J_{\ln S}(q_1, \dots, q_J)$ of $\ln S$ as $(q_1, \dots, q_J) \cdot J_{\ln S}(q) = (1, \dots, 1)$. With $v = \ln S(q)$ and noting that $(\ln S)^{-1}(v) = H(e^v)$, this is equivalent to

$$(q_1, \dots, q_J) = (q_1, \dots, q_J) \cdot J_{\ln S}(q) \cdot J_{(\ln S)^{-1}}(v) = (1, \dots, 1) \cdot J_{H(e^v)}(v).$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned} (1, \dots, 1) \cdot J_{H(e^v)}(v) &= (1, \dots, 1) \cdot \{e^{G(v)} G_j(v) G_k(v) + e^{G(v)} G_{jk}(v) 1_{\{j=k\}}\} \\ &= (q_1, \dots, q_J) \end{aligned}$$

as required. We have used first that

$$(q_1, \dots, q_J) = H(e^v),$$

and second that $(1, \dots, 1) \cdot \{G_{jk}(v)\} = 0$, where the latter assertion follows since $1 = \sum_{j=1}^J G_j(v)$. ■

Proof of Theorem 6. At no loss of generality, the nesting structure \mathcal{G} can be divided into layers L such that the nests $g \in L$ within each layer form a partition of $\{1, \dots, J\}$ and such that there is a single nesting parameter μ_L associated with each layer with $\sum_L \mu_L = 1$. Denote by g_{Lj} the nest in layer L that contains j . Write $r_g = \sum_{k \in g} r_k$, $q_g = \sum_{k \in g} q_k$, noting that $\sum_g r_g = \sum_g q_g = 1$. Recall also that $S^{(j)}(q) = \prod_L q_{g_{Lj}}^{\mu_L}$.

We will first show existence and uniqueness of a fixed point. Note next that for $r \in \Delta$:

$$w(r) = \left\{ \frac{r_i e^{v_i} / S^{(i)}(r)}{\sum_j r_j e^{v_j} / S^{(j)}(r)} \right\} = \left\{ \frac{r_i S^{(i)}(r) / S^{(i)}(r)}{\sum_j r_j S^{(j)}(r) / S^{(j)}(r)} \right\} = r,$$

which shows that r is a fixed point. If $q \in \Delta$ is a fixed point, potentially different from r , then $q_i = q_i (e^{v_i} / S^{(i)}(q)) e^{-c}$, where $e^c = \sum_j q_j e^{v_j} / S^{(j)}(q)$, and then $v = \ln S(r) + c$. The invertibility of S implies that $q = r$ and then the fixed point is unique.

We then need to show that iterations with (15) from any starting point in Δ converges to the fixed point. Define for convenience

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_j &= \frac{S^{(j)}(r)}{S^{(j)}(q)} = \prod_L \left(\frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right)^{\mu_L}, \\ w_j(q) &= \frac{q_i e^{v_i} / S^{(i)}(q)}{\sum_j q_j e^{v_j} / S^{(j)}(q)}. \end{aligned}$$

Using that $v = \ln S(r) + c$ with $c \in \mathbb{R}$ we may rewrite (15) as

$$w_j(q) = \frac{q_j e^{v_j} / S^{(j)}(q)}{\sum_i q_i e^{v_i} / S^{(i)}(q)} = \frac{q_j \frac{S^{(j)}(r)}{S^{(j)}(q)}}{\sum_i q_i \frac{S^{(i)}(r)}{S^{(i)}(q)}} = \frac{q_j \pi_j}{q \cdot \pi}.$$

We will show that $d_r(w(q)) \leq d_r(q)$, with strict inequality when $q \neq r$. This will mean that $w(q)$ is closer to r than q . Evaluating $d_r(w(q))$ leads to

$$\begin{aligned} d_r(w(q)) &= d_r(q) + r \cdot \ln \frac{r}{w} = d_r(q) + \ln(q \cdot \pi) - r \cdot \ln \pi \\ &= d_r(q) + \ln \left(\sum_j q_j \prod_L \left(\frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right)^{\mu_L} \right) - \sum_j r_j \ln \prod_L \left(\frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right)^{\mu_L}. \end{aligned}$$

We thus need to bound the last two terms. Observe first that

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \left(\sum_j q_j \prod_L \left(\frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right)^{\mu_L} \right) &= \ln \left(\sum_j q_j \exp \left(\sum_L \mu_L \ln \left(\frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right) \right) \right) \\ &\leq \ln \left(\sum_L \sum_j q_j \mu_L \frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right) = \ln \left(\sum_L \sum_{g \in L} q_g \mu_L \frac{r_g}{q_g} \right) \\ &= \ln \left(\sum_L \mu_L \sum_{g \in L} r_g \right) = 0, \end{aligned}$$

with strict inequality unless $r_{g_{Lj}} = q_{g_{Lj}}$ for all l, j . Strict inequality would imply $S(r) = S(q)$, and further that $r = q$, so we conclude the inequality is strict unless $r = q$.

We also need to bound

$$\begin{aligned} - \sum_j r_j \ln \prod_L \left(\frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} \right)^{\mu_L} &= - \sum_j r_j \sum_L \mu_L \ln \frac{r_{g_{Lj}}}{q_{g_{Lj}}} = - \sum_L \mu_L \sum_{g \in L} r_g \ln \frac{r_g}{q_g} \\ &= - \sum_L \mu_L d_{\{r_g\}}(\{q_g\}) \leq 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows since the term is a weighted sum of Kullback-Leibler distances. Again the inequality is strict unless $r = q$. We conclude that $d_r(w(q)) \leq d_r(q)$ and that the inequality is strict unless $r = q$.

Now consider a sequence $\{q^n\}$ constructed by iterating (15). Then $d_r(q^n)$ is weakly decreasing and hence $d_r(q^n) \rightarrow \rho$ for some $\rho \geq 0$. If $\rho > 0$, then a convergent subsequence can be extracted from $\{q^n\}$ with limit point \hat{q} satisfying $d_r(\hat{q}) = \rho$ by continuity of w . Now $d_r(w(\hat{q})) < \rho$, while there are points from the

sequence $\{q^n\}$ arbitrarily close to \hat{q} with $d_r(q^n) > \rho$. This contradicts continuity of w and we conclude that $\rho = 0$ and hence that $q^n \rightarrow r$.

If S has the form (16), then we can improve the bound on $d_r(w(q))$:

$$d_r(w(q)) - d_r(q) \leq -\sum_L \mu_L d_{\{r_g\}}(\{q_g\}) \leq -\mu_0 d_r(q),$$

which is the desired result. ■

B Notation

Symbol	Interpretation
p	Price vector
P	Probability vector
q, r	Consumption vector of the differentiated good, probability vector
S	Flexible generator
G	Expected maximum utility
G^*	Convex conjugate of G
H	Inverse of S
a	Vector of intrinsic utilities of the differentiated good
Ω	Flexible entropy
v	$a - p$
α, β	Utility parameters
u	Utility
μ	Nesting parameter
Δ	Unit simplex
$\ \cdot\ $	Euclidian norm